State-Sponsored Cyberattacks: Bridging the Gaps in International Criminal Accountability

Abstract

Background: State-sponsored cyberattacks have become a significant global threat, undermining national security, critical infrastructure, and international relations. These attacks are often difficult to attribute due to the use of proxy actors and the anonymity afforded by cyberspace. Existing international legal frameworks struggle to address the complexities of cyber warfare and hold states accountable for such actions.

Methodology: This research employs a qualitative approach, analyzing key case studies of state-sponsored cyberattacks (e.g., Stuxnet, SolarWinds) and reviewing relevant international treaties such as the Budapest Convention and the Tallinn Manual. The study also explores customary international law and state responsibility in the cyber context, with an emphasis on the gaps and challenges in the current legal system.

Objectives: The primary aim of this research is to identify the deficiencies in international legal frameworks that hinder the prosecution of state-sponsored cyberattacks. The study proposes legal and institutional reforms to bridge these gaps and enhance mechanisms for attribution and accountability in cyberspace.

Findings: The research highlights the need for robust international frameworks to address state-sponsored cyberattacks. Expanding ICC jurisdiction, new treaties, and forensic advancements are essential. Balancing sovereignty, addressing geopolitical resistance, and learning from past cases are crucial for creating effective, collaborative solutions to cyber threats.

Originality/Novelty: This study offers a comprehensive analysis of the intersection between international criminal law and cyber operations, proposing reforms to strengthen accountability mechanisms for state-sponsored cyberattacks. It contributes to the academic discourse by addressing legal gaps and proposing solutions for the evolving digital threat landscape.